In the case of Furlong Services Ltd v HMRC [2026] UKUT 173 (TCC), the UT has refused an application for an extension of time to seek permission to appeal to the UT against an FTT decision concerning an information notice. The FTT had confirmed and varied certain aspects of the information notice and had, in accordance with FA 2008, Sch. 36, para. 32(5), stated that its decision was final.
Procedure – application for extension of time to seek permission to appeal – Martland v HMRC applied – application refused
Applying the Martland criteria, the UT judged that the delay was serious and significant and had been caused by a “catalogue or errors”. Considering all the circumstances the UT noted that:
“There is plainly no good reason for the Appellant’s culpable delay of 5 months in applying to the Upper Tribunal for permission to appeal the FTT’s Decision. The Appellant’s solicitors appear to have given no thought to the Upper Tribunal’s rules and procedures in applying for permission to appeal. … I do not regard the Appellant’s breach as ‘technical’ as alleged in the Extension Application. The Appellant’s solicitor has demonstrated an unacceptable ignorance of the rules, at best, and complete disregard for the rules at worst … Overall, I do not consider it appropriate to treat the Appellant as having no responsibility for its solicitor’s defaults. Having said that, I take into account in the exercise of my discretion that the Appellant was not aware of those defaults. … The Appellant submits that there is no prejudice and that HMRC were well aware that the Appellant intended to appeal. I do not consider that is correct. There has been prejudice, in that HMRC have had to devote resources to the Extension Application … The Appellant will be prejudiced if time is not extended. It will be required to comply with the information notice, as varied by the FTT. However, Mr Jones accepted that compliance with the information notice as varied would not be unduly onerous or costly. As indicated above, the Appellant will be required to provide information and documents to HMRC which it might not otherwise have been required to provide. In the context of this case, including the nature of the information and documents involved, I am not satisfied that this would amount to serious prejudice.”
Considering whether, if allowed, an appeal would be successful, the UT judged that:
“There are two aspects to the application for permission to appeal. Firstly, on the face of it there is a statutory bar on appeals from the FTT’s Decision in this type of case. Paragraph 32(5) Schedule 36 Finance Act 2008 provides that a decision of the FTT on an appeal against an information notice is ‘final’. It has long been recognised that this has the effect that there is no right of appeal from the FTT to the Upper Tribunal. Secondly, it is said that the FTT erred in law in its approach to the Appellant’s appeal against the information notice.
Mr Jones made submissions as to why paragraph 32(5) is not a statutory bar to an appeal to the Upper Tribunal in this type of case. Ultimately, however, I am not satisfied that there are strong grounds to say that there is a right of appeal. In the circumstances, I approach the Extension Application on the basis that it is arguable that the Appellant would obtain permission to appeal, and I give weight to the prejudice suffered by the Appellant on that basis.”
The UT concluded that:
“Overall, taking all the circumstances into account, I am satisfied that time should not be extended.”
https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukut/tcc/2026/173
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In Schedule 36 Notices – HMRC Information Requests, tax barrister Keith Gordon encourages full compliance with legitimate requests from HMRC but also recommends that taxpayers should stand up to requests that do not meet the strict statutory criteria. The author reminds professional advisers of the risks of providing more information than the law requires.
