In the case of Apollo Belvedere Services LLP (in liquidation) v HMRC [2026] UKFTT 687 (TC), the FTT has judged that Ms Staveley, a partner of the LLP, could not be substituted with the LLP in the appeal against a closure notice, however the FTT agreed to add her as a respondent and make directions to prevent the liquidator withdrawing the LLP appeal or the LLP being dissolved without the FTT’s permission.
PROCEDURE – Application for substitution of party – Whether applicant has standing to appeal – Tribunal’s jurisdiction – Alternatively whether Applicant be added as a respondent to proceedings with consequential directions being made
The closure notice assessed the company to approximately £11.1m of tax plus interest while Ms Staveley had been issued with an associated penalty as partner of the LLP on the basis that there was a deliberate inaccuracy in the LLP return. The amount of the penalty was approximately £6.4m. The FTT summarised Ms Staveley’s predicament as follows:
“If the Tribunal were to confirm the Closure Notice in the LLP Appeal, HMRC will issue Ms Staveley with a Notice under s 28B(4) TMA rendering her personally liable for the entirety of the tax. There is no statutory right of appeal against a s 28B(4) TMA Notice and any challenge must be made by way of judicial review.
However, as the LLP is currently in liquidation the decision whether or not to pursue the LLP Appeal rests with the liquidators and not Ms Staveley. Because there is a possibility that the LLP Appeal could be withdrawn – the Application states that this has been ‘explicitly threatened by (some of) the liquidators unless a payment is made to them’ – Ms Staveley has made the Application to ensure that she had the ability to challenge the Closure Notice effectively at the Tribunal without the risk of the liquidators withdrawing the LLP Appeal or demanding payment from her.”
Considering the potential substitution, the FTT concluded that:
“It must therefore follow, as HMRC contend, that an individual partner does not have a personal right of appeal against a s 28B TMA closure notice, but that, as a partnership may appeal against such a notice, an individual partner may only appeal as a representative of the partnership.
In the present case, given the relationship between Ms Staveley and the liquidators (see paragraphs 12 and 13, above), it is clear that she is not acting as a representative of the LLP but in her personal capacity. As such, because she does not have standing to pursue the LLP Appeal in her personal capacity, Ms Staveley cannot be substituted for the LLP in the LLP Appeal.”
However, the FTT concluded that “this does not prevent Ms Staveley from being added to the proceedings as a respondent under rule 9(2) FTT Rules” and that the FTT “does have the power to make a direction precluding the liquidators from dissolving the LLP without its permission.” Considering whether it should use this power, the FTT decided that:
“Notwithstanding HMRC’s assurance that they would object to any attempted withdrawal of the LLP Appeal, I consider that such a direction would ensure that the liquidators understood that the LLP Appeal could not be withdrawn without the permission of the Tribunal. Such a direction would also be a more efficient use of the Tribunal’s and parties’ time as it would avoid the need for further litigation resulting from a purported withdrawal of the LLP Appeal and HMRC’s objection to it.
Therefore, for the reasons above, I consider that Ms Staveley should be added to the proceedings as a respondent under rule 9(2) FTT Rules and directions made prohibiting the LLP (ie the liquidators) from withdrawing the LLP Appeal or the LLP being dissolved without the Tribunal’s permission.”
https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukftt/tc/2026/687
Related content from Claritax Books
In Tax Appeals – Law and Practice at the FTT, tax barrister Keith Gordon analyses some 500 precedents to show how the FTT rules are applied in practice, and how taxpayers may use the tribunal system for appealing against tax decisions.
